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1.  Introduction 
 
Circuses can be dated to the Roman empire when the emperor held spectacular events at the 
Circus Maximus and the Coliseum in Rome, full of lions, elephants and chariot racing. With the 
fall of the Roman empire circus type entertainment did not disappear completely. Jugglers, 
horse trainers, clowns and acrobats continued to entertain at fairs and castles, in fact anywhere 
that they could generate some extra cash.  
The modern circus was originated in 1768, when Philip Astley built the New British Riding 
School or Amphitheatre Riding Ring. It combined several exhibitions, such as cavalry 
horsemanship, clowning derived from the commedia dell’arte, vaulting as developed to highly 
skilled art in the sixteenth-century French courts. This form spread worldwide and became 
known as ‘circus’, ‘zirkus’, ‘circo’, ‘cirque’, ‘tsirk’, and so on (Burgess, 1974; Dupavillon, 
1982; Dapporto and Sagot-Duvauroux, 2000).  
Nowadays, internationally circus is flourishing. Canada, Russia, China, France, Belgium and 
Australia have national circus schools; Portugal, Sweden and Belgium have independent 
schools; Cirque du Soleil, founded by the Quebec government in 1985, has now several shows 
across four countries (Hall, 2002).  
Circus represents a physical and visual art form that exists in its own right (not as an adjunct to 
theatre or dance) and it is one of the most accessible art forms  that exist today (Hall, 2002). 
Although its cultural importance, however, economics has completely neglected to address this 
topic. There are two main reasons for this. First, the economics of arts has considered circus as a 
minor performing arts. Secondly, there are difficulties in the collection of reliable quantitative 
information on circus. This paper represents a first attempt to analyse the demand for circus in 
Italy.  
The demand for performing arts have been extensively analysed in literature. Several papers are 
primarily interested in the impact of prices on live event attendances (Felton, 1989; Kracman, 
1996; Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 1996; O’Hagan, 1996; Billie Hansen, 1997; Colbert et 
al., 1998). Other papers discuss the role of personal characteristics and the social environmental 
in which decisions are made (Upright, 2004; Ateca-Amestoy, 2005). There are also a number of 
studies focusing on the show specific characteristics (Abbè-Decarroux, 1994; Urrutiaguer, 2002; 
Werck and Heyndels, 2007). To our knowledge, however, there do not appear to be any 
investigations for circus.   
In this study we use information on the tournée of the bigger circuses performing in Italy during 
2005 and 2006 to identify the determinants of the demand for circus, both in terms of structural 
characteristics of the shows and socio-economic factors which impact on it. The results show a 
positive elasticity of demand to income and, differently from similar studies on performing arts,   3
to ticket price. There also differences between circuses in the importance of  numbers with 
animals. 
The rest of the paper may be briefly outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the current 
situation of circus in Italy. Empirical specification and data are shown in Section 3 and Section 
4 respectively. The empirical findings are summarized in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Circus in Italy 
In Italy the total number of circuses has been more or less stable during the years, although a 
number of shut-downs have been registered, replaced by new companies.
1 Depending on the 
season, the number of circus varies between 75 and 120-130 units. They are run by, more or 
less, 60 families. The are few big circuses whose staff can overcome one hundred units. The 
bigger circuses use to concentrate national activity during the autumn and the winter, going 
abroad during the summer (East Europe and North Africa). The rest of the circus companies is 
represented by small (and very small) circuses which use to work only in tourist locations 
during the summer.  
In Italy although the State recognized the cultural promotion role of circus since 1968, the 
legislative pressure regarding licensing, animal welfare, disability discrimination, health and 
safety, rigging, child protection and insurance, has an administrative and economic impact on 
companies. Within this context, three main issues emerge: founding, performance grounds, and 
circus animals. Circus companies have enjoyed financial support for their practice since the Law 
337/68. Afterwards, an important step was taken with the introduction of the Unified Fund for 
the Performing Arts (FUS, Fondo Unico per lo Spettacolo) in 1985. It defines the amount of 
grants to be allocated for performing arts (theatre, music, dance, and circus). The basic criteria 
for allocating funds to circus activities are based on a mix of both quantitative (decisions based 
on the size of audiences, number of productions, number of employees etc.) and qualitative 
aspects (discretionary judgements dealing with quality made by a consultative panel of experts). 
As a consequence, financial aid concerns all sorts of live performance productions as well as 
programming and it takes the form of granting subsidies to companies and festivals, supported  
for the creation of shows and the carrying out of promotion. However, in the wider context of 
grants for the arts, the number and value of awards to circus artists and companies is relatively 
small, and is going to be reduced.  
The Law 337/68 also defined the administrative conditions for the circus tournée, even if it let 
the local authorities to provide the performance grounds. Unfortunately, some local authorities 
fail to provide understanding when dealing with circus and tent to touring circuses, which still 
suffer from a lack of appropriate performance grounds for which they pay hire fees. Very few 
big cities have public performance grounds for circus and it is not unlikely that circus 
companies must rent private ones or, as the case for the city of Rome, stay outside the ring of 
the city, in a close (small) town.  
                                                           
1 During the last years some important were closed (among the others, Florilegio by Darix Togni, Liana Nando 
Rinaldo Orfei circus, etc.).   5
Finally, there is a growing movement against the use of animals within the circus. In Italy circus 
involve approximately 1,300 captive animals. Animal  rights activists complain that many of 
these animals are subjected to beatings, whippings, electrical charges and starvation, and are 
often drugged. Although this appears a questionable issue (Paladino, 1990; ECA, 2005), animal 
lobby has induced Parliament to produce a more stringent legislation on animal welfare which is 
going to preclude smaller circuses from having numbers with animals, as well as imposing 
growing costs on bigger circus which will impact on future programs. 
The quality of work developed in the country is mixed. The bigger circuses, with some 
exceptions among the smaller, combine circus skills with narrative theatre-making and 
choreography fusions of forms by producing high quality shows. The attempt is to move from a 
very traditional skills-based raw entertainment to a more artistically challenging and innovative 
performance. By contrast, most of the smaller circuses tend to perform the same low quality 
shows across years. Table 1 shows the composition of the shows performed by the bigger circus 





The percentage of numbers directly performed by owner family members vary between null in 
the case of Moscow circus, whose ownership is not referable to a single family, to around 50 
percent. The percentage of numbers with animals varies between 17 and 46 percent. The 
number of exhibitions are then classified for techniques (Burgess, 1974).  The average numbers 
of juggling performers (balancing, tossing, catching, kicking, twirling and spinning of objects; 
etc.) in the shows is 1.6, a value quite similar to acrobat performers (jumping rope; trampoline; 
etc.) which is 2.0, and vaulting (flying trapeze; tissue; etc.), whose value is 1.7. By contrast, the 
average numbers of equilibrium performers (balancing on rolling; hand balancing; human 
pyramids; etc.) is only 0.8. Finally, the residual category of others is quite heterogeneous and it 
includes contortionism, opening and closing numbers, clownery, etc. 
  
                                                           
2 The traditional classification by Burgess (1974) has been integrated to take account of some numbers recently 
developed.   6
3.  Circus demand 
The primary aim of the paper is to estimate the determinants of circus consumption in Italy. The 
basic model is drawn from the standard model of household consumption. We assume that a 
consumer has a utility function that can be written as a function of a private good, X, and circus 
consumption, which is treated as consisting of a set of N characteristics, {} N z z z z Z ,..., , , 3 2 1 =  
(Lancaster, 1966). Taking X as the numeraire, and assuming that the consumer is initially 
endowed with an income Y, the consumer will maximize his utility subject to a budget 
constraint,  () Y Z P X ≤ + . As a result, a demand function that takes into account output 
characteristics can be written as (Dewenter and Westermann, 2005; Werck and Heyndels, 
2007): 
 
() Z Y P P f Q other , , , =            ( 1 )  
 
The amount of circus demanded depends on the ticket price, P; the price of substitutes, Pother; 
the consumer income, Y; and a vector of output characteristics, Z.  
The demand for performing arts is commonly measured by number of paying attendances. 
However, due to the difficulty to collect suitable data from circuses to be able to determine box 
office, we use total number of available seats for all shows taken in a single city, defined as the 
number of seats multiplied for the number of performances taken place in a single location, seat. 
As a consequence caution is necessary since an overestimation can occur due to measurement 
error. 
Circus prices vary across different weekdays, locations, and seasons, but these variations 
typically vanish with the use of aggregated data (Hand, 2002; Einav, 2003). Hence, in this study 
we use an average ticket price, weighted for the number of seats, price.  
The price of other cultural goods is proxied by introducing a leisure price variable, leis, 
constructed as  () U W − 1 , where W is the regional hourly wage and U is the regional 
unemployment rate (Corning and Levy, 2002). This may also be interpreted as an additional 
component of total cost borne by consumers attending the circus to the extent that it is a time-
intensive activity: an increase in the opportunity costs of going to circus, due to its 
intensiveness, may induce a reduction in consumption and, simultaneously, an expansion of 
rival activities. 
The measure of income used in the analysis is per capita provincial income, gdp. Although most 
of previous studies on performing arts find a positive effect of income on demand, we are not   7
able to predict whether the income elasticity of demand for circus will be higher or lower than 
unity.  
Demographic variables are also included in the model. The age of the individual is expected to 
be a predictor of attendance. In particular, the percentage of provincial population aged 0-14, 
age, is expected to be positively correlated to attendance. Furthermore, we also included the log 
of provincial population, pop, which is likely to positively related to total circus consumption. 
In order to examine the importance of the geographical location where circuses perform we 
introduce a set of dummies: north,  which assumes value 1 if circus location is in the north of 
Italy, 0 otherwise; centre, which assumes value 1 if circus location is in the centre of Italy, 0 
otherwise; south (excluded variable), which assumes value 1 if circus location is in the south of 
Italy, 0 otherwise. 
Although our sample is composed of the bigger circuses performing in Italy, a smaller group of 
them (Americano, Medrano, and Moira Orfei) are used to informally coordinate about locations, 
policies, etc., and are commonly regarded as the most important in Italy. Hence, we introduce a 
dummy variable, big, which assumes value 1 for the Americano, Medrano, and Moira Orfei 
circuses, 0 otherwise. 
Finally, following Lancaster, we need to identify characteristics that matter to consumers. To 
this aim, we use objectively determinable output characteristics, such as the number of 
exhibitions classified for techniques. Because of the amorphous quality of circus techniques, 
any attempt to classify them is somewhat arbitrary. In what follows, we identify two broad 
categories: ani, the total number of performers with animals in a show and all other numbers of 
performers, other (excluded variable).  
Basic econometric specification is the following: 
 
i i i
i i j j j j i ij
anima big
centre north pop age gdp leis price seat
ε β β
β β β β β β β β
+ + +
+ + + + + + + =
9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln ln ln
                  ( 2 )  
 
where i indicates circus and j indicates city where circus performs.  
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4.  Data 
Data consists of a sample of 174 observations regarding tournée of circuses performing in Italy 
during 2005 and 2006. Information on circus is collected from the web site “circusfans”,
3 while 
socio-economic variables are drawn from different institutional sources.
4 As discussed earlier, 
the sample is restricted to bigger circuses (over 750 seats). Descriptive statistics for the model 




Average number of seats for each location is around 24,000, which varies from a minimum of 
2,000 for four days location (Acquatico Bellucci) to a maximum of 132,000 for forty-four days 
location in Naples (Medrano). Average circus ticket in the sample is 17.4 euros, with a 
maximum of 24.2 euros and a minimum of 13.1 euros. Average leisure price in the sample is 
28.6 euros with a standard deviation of 12.6 percent. The average per capita income is 
approximately 21,030 euros, with a maximum of 43,800 and a minimum of 11,195 euros. 
Thirteen percent of the population in the sample are children under 15 year old. As far as the 
geographical distribution of circus performances are regarded around 60 percent are in the north 
of Italy, 15 percentage in the centre and less than 1/3 in the south of Italy. The importance of the  
Americano, Medrano, and Moira Orfei circuses is confirmed as 35 percent of total observations 
are referred to them. Finally, in the research sample the number of performers with animals in a 
show varies from a low of 3.0 to a high of 6.0, while in the case of all the other numbers the 
value varies from a low of 7.0 to a high of 12.0. 
 
                                                           
3 www.circusfans.it 
4 See Appendix.   9
5.  Results 
The correlations between variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 3. There  is  a 
strong positive correlation between per capita income and leisure price (r = .70, significant at p 
< 0.1 level), population lower than fifteen years old and per capita income  (r = -0.76, 
significant at p < 0.1 level), circus locations at  the north and leisure price price (r = .74, 
significant at p < 0.1 level) and bigger circuses and ticket price price (r = .91, significant at p < 
0.1 level). Although there is no formal cutoff value to use with the Variance Inflation Factor for 
determining presence of multicollinearity, values of VIF exceeding 10 are often regarded as 
indicating multicollinearity. In our case, the VIF is 4.23 and this leads to the conclusion that no 
multicollinearity exists between any of the independent variables.  
 
 [TABLE 3] 
 
Table 4 reports results for equation (2), using OLS and IV estimators, respectively. Standard 
errors and variance-covariance matrices of the coefficients have been computed by using the 




In testing for the correct model specification, we perform the link test. The link test computes a 
new regression model using as predictor variables the risk score from the original model plus its 
square (quadratic term). If the additional quadratic term is significant, there is evidence of 
model misspecification. In our case, both models display a non significant quadratic term, 
providing no evidence of incorrect model specification.  
The goodness of fit values presented is 56 per cent in both models. Column (1) presents 
coefficients and standard deviations of the OLS regression model. All estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant, with the only exception of leisure price and population under 15 years 
old. Hence, two expected results are refuted by results: there seems to be no rivality or 
complementarity  with other leisure activities; younger people do not represent a preferential 
target of circus advertising. 
Rather surprisingly, the results show that an increase in price impacts positively on circus 
consumption, resulting in a positive and significant sign of price elasticity. This may be 
explained by the use of total amount of disposable seats for each location as dependent variable. 
In fact, bigger circuses, which adopt higher average prices, usually stay longer in a single 
location and so a positive correlation between prices and seats is likely to be observed. Income   10
elasticity is positive and higher than unity, meaning that circus can be identified as a luxury 
good. Population as well displays a positive effect on circus consumption.  The negative 
coefficients associated to circus locations in the north and the centre of Italy capture the 
preference of circuses for longer locations in the south of Italy where the demand is expected to 
be larger. Turning to circus dimension (or prestige), the higher the number of performing days 
from Americano, Medrano, and Moira Orfei circuses, the lower the demand for circus. A way to 
interpret this result is as follows. Since the quality of these circuses is high, the more they 
perform the lower the likelihood for a person attending them to ask for additional shows. As a 
consequence, the increase in total amount of demand  due to additional performance days from 
the bigger does not compensate the reduction in total demand for other circuses. Finally, an 
unexpected result is that the relative impact of numbers with animals on circus consumption is 
negative.  
Column (2) presents coefficients and standard deviations of the IV regression model. In order to 
account for somewhat spurious correlation between demand and per capita income, equation (2) 
was re-estimated by instrumental variables, using lagged values of per capita income as 
instruments. All coefficients display the same sign as in the OLS model, with the exception of 
per capita income which is not longer statistically significant. Again, results confirm a negative 
effect of numbers with animal on demand.  
Although this result seems to suggest a partial success of the movement against the use of 
animals within the circus in influencing demand, however, additional investigation is necessary 
due to the aggregate nature of data. Furthermore, to the extent that bigger circuses impact on 
demand, it can be useful  to separately analyze the two groups:  the most important (Americano, 





An F-test on the overall sample versus the three circuses and the other groups is run. The F-
statistic calculated is 8.05. This far exceeds the critical value at the 1% level, allowing us to 
reject the null hypothesis. In Table 5 columns (1) and (2) report the OLS coefficients and the 
standard deviation of the two groups, respectively. All of the significant variables in the 
previously OLS estimation are also statistically significant here and display the same sign, with 
two exceptions in the case of the first group (Americano, Medrano, and Moira Orfei). The first 
is that price ticket is no longer statistically significant.  The second is the positive impact of 
numbers with animals on circus consumption. This result contrasts with the previously OLS   11
estimation suggesting the importance of numbers with animals in attracting people for this 
group. The IV coefficients are reported in columns (3) and (4). Results are analogous to the 
previous model in the case of the other group, while in the most important group per capita 
income and location in the north are no longer statistically significant. Again, animals have a 
positive impact on demand. 
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6.  Conclusion 
Several empirical papers have analyzed the demand for performing arts. However, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study focusing on demand for circus. In fact, both the low attention 
of cultural economics, which has often considered circus as a minor performing arts, and 
difficulties to collect quantitative information on circus, have prevented empirical 
investigations.  
This study fills in this gap by analysing the demand for circus in Italy. To this aim, we collect 
information on the tournée of the bigger circuses performing in Italy during 2005 and 2006. 
This paper pointed out some interesting results. First, differently from other forms of 
performing arts, circus demand displays a positive elasticity to price. This may be partially 
explained by the use of total amount of disposable seats for each location as a proxy for price, 
which may result in bias the results.  
Secondly, the movement against the use of animals within the circus (and the consequent 
stringent legislation on animal welfare) seems to succeed in influencing demand. In fact, the 
relative impact of numbers with animals on circus consumption is negative. However, the 
behaviour of the most important circuses contrasts with the full sample estimation suggesting 
the importance of numbers with animals in attracting people. 
Thirdly, as far as the other independent variables are considered, this study shows that the 
income elasticity is positive, analogously to what found in similar studies on performing arts, as 
well as the effect of population on circus consumption.  
What is done here though is just a beginning. Further work is necessary. This includes the use of 
different dependent variables (when available); an extension of the model to focus on supply 
side of the market; and the use of micro data to analyze individual preferences. 
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TABLE 1. Bigger Circuses in Italy (2006)               
                  







performed by  
property family 
members Animals Juggling Equilibrium Acrobat Vaulting Other 
               
Mosca 5,000  12  0  2  1  1  1  3  4 
Americano 4,000  15  7  6  1  1  1  2  4 
Medrano 3,000  16  2  5  2  1  3  1  4 
Nando Orfei - Errani  2,400  15  2  3  2  0  4  2  4 
Embellriva 2,200  11  4  4  1  0  2  3  1 
Moira 2,000  12  3  5  1  1  1  2  2 
Lidia Togni  1,600  13  3  3  2  1  4  0  3 
Stelle 1,200  13  6  6  2  0  1  2  2 
Praga 1,200  14  6  4  2  2  2  1  3 
Acquatico Bellucci  750  12  7  4  2  1  1  1  3 
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TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics     
      
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.   Max. 
              
seat  23,990.23 24,000.08 2,000.00 132,000.00 
price  17.36 3.20 13.13 24.25 
leis  28.57 3.62 21.93 33.22 
gdp  21,030.17 5,981.43 11,195.00 43,800.00 
age  13.20 2.34 9.36 19.20 
pop  584,404.90 473,032.00 89,852.00 2,624,467.00 
north  0.57 0.50 0 1 
centre  0.15 0.36 0 1 
south  0.28 0.45 0 1 
big  0,35 0,48 0 1 
ani  4.48 1.11 2.00 6.00 
other  7.97 1.26 7.00 12.00 
               17
TABLE 3. Correlation matrix       
             
                        
  price leisure  gdp  age  pop  north centre  big anima 
                        
price  1.0000            
leis  -0.1039 1.0000           
gdp  -0.1237 0.7145*  1.0000         
age  0.1973* -0.6621* -0.7620* 1.0000       
pop  0.1197 0.1069 0.2588*  0.1043  1.0000        
north  0.2412* 0.7416* 0.5974* 0.5244* -0.0013 1.0000      
centre  0.1003 0.0945 0.0720  0.2114* 0.0443 0.4924* 1.0000     
big  0.9196* -0.1106 -0.1571  0.1539 0.0328 0.2847* 0.1841  1.0000   
anima   0.3273*  0.1308   -0.0168   0.0323  -0.0716  0.0546  -0.0148  0.4519* 1.0000 
Note. *p<0.01.  18
TABLE 4. Results (full sample)    
        
      OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2)    
              
price 



























































              
        
N   174  174   
R-squared   0.56  0.56   
F   24.01  21.33   
linktest  0.19  0.16   
              
Note. *, **, ***, significance at 1%, 5%, 10%.   19
TABLE 5. Results (samples)      
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N   61  113    61  113 
R-squared   0.52  0.60    0.45  0.60 
F   17.90  22.83    7.21  21.48 
                    
Note. *, **, ***, significance at 1%, 5%, 10%.   20
Appendix. Sources of data 
 
Variables Description    Source 
seat  Number of seats multiplied 
for the number of 




price  Average ticket price, 




leis  () U W − 1 , where W is the 
regional hourly wage and U is 
the regional unemployment 
rate 
 www.istat.it 
gdp  Per capita provincial income   www.tagliacarne.it 
age  Percentage of provincial 
population aged 0-14 
 www.istat.it 
pop  Provincial population    www.istat.it 
north  Dummy variable if circus 
location at north of Italy 
 www.circusfans.it 
 
centre  Dummy variable if circus 
location at centre of Italy 
 www.circusfans.it 
 
big  Dummy variable for 
Americano, Medrano, and 
Moira Orfei circuses 
 www.circusfans.it 
 
anima  Numbers with animals in the 
show 








The full text of the working papers is downloadable at http://polis.unipmn.it/ 
 
*Economics Series    **Political Theory Series   
ε Al.Ex Series 
 
 
2007 n.99*  Roberto  Zanola:  Major influences on circus attendance 
2007 n.98**  Corrado  Malandrino:  Pre-modern covenant and covenantalism in Daniel Judah 
Elazar's federalist elaboration 
 
2007  n.97
ε  Stefania Ottone, Ferruccio Ponzano and Roberto Ricciuti: Simulating voting rule 
reforms for the Italian parliament. An economic perspective 
 
2007  n.96*  Albert Breton, Anthony Scott and Angela Fraschini: Explaining differences in 
environmental governance patterns between Canada, Italy and the United States 
 
2007 n.95*  Roberto  Ricciuti:  The quest for a fiscal rule: Italy, 1861-1998 
2007  n.94
ε  Davide Biassoni: L'influenza dei sistemi elettorali nella stabilita' dei governi 
2007  n.93**  Joerg Luther and Domenico Francavilla: Nepal's constitutional transition 
 
2007  n.91
ε  Marie-Edith Bissey and Guido Ortona: The program for the simulation of 
electoral systems ALEX4.1: what it does and how to use it 
 
2007 n.90*  Roberto  Ricciuti:  Un'analisi economica della partecipazione ai referendum 
abrogativi 
 
2007  n.89*  Michela Bia and Alessandra Mattei: Application of the Generalized Propensity 
Score. Evaluation of public contributions to Piedmont entreprises 
 
2007 n.88*  Michela  Bia:  The Propensity Score method in public policy evaluation: a survey 
2007  n.87*  Luca Mo Costabella and Alberto Martini: Valutare gli effetti indesiderati 
dell’istituto della mobilità sul comportamento delle imprese e dei lavoratori. 
 
2007  n.86
ε  Stefania Ottone: Are people samaritans or avengers? 
2007 n.85*  Roberto  Zanola:  The dynamics of art prices: the selection corrected repeat-sales 
index 
 
2006  n.84*  Antonio Nicita and Giovanni B. Ramello: Property, liability and market power: 
the antitrust side of copyright 
 
2006 n.83*  Gianna  Lotito:  Dynamic inconsistency and different models of dynamic choice – 
a review  
 
2006 n.82**  Gabriella  Silvestrini:  Le républicanisme genevois au XVIII
e siècle 
2006  n.81*  Giorgio Brosio and Roberto Zanola: Can violence be rational? An empirical 
analysis of Colombia 
 
2006  n.80*  Franco Cugno and Elisabetta Ottoz: Static inefficiency of compulsory licensing: 
Quantity vs. price competition 
 
2006 n.79*  Carla  Marchese:  Rewarding the consumer for curbing the evasion of commodity 
taxes? 
 
2006 n.78**  Joerg  Luther:  Percezioni europee della storia costituzionale cinese 
2006  n.77
ε  Guido Ortona, Stefania Ottone, Ferruccio Ponzano and Francesco Scacciati: 
Labour supply in presence of taxation financing public services. An 
experimental approach. 
 
2006  n.76*  Giovanni B. Ramello and Francesco Silva: Appropriating signs and meaning: 
the elusive economics of trademark 
 
2006  n.75*  Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti: Legislature size and government spending 
in Italian regions: forecasting the effects of a reform 
 
2006  n.74**  Joerg Luther and Corrado Malandrino: Letture provinciali della costituzione 
europea 
 
2006  n.73*  Giovanni B. Ramello: What's in a sign? Trademark law and economic theory 
2006  n.72*  Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti: Determinants of direct democracy across 
Europe 
 
2006  n.71*  Angela Fraschini and Franco Oscultati: La teoria economica 
dell'associazionismo tra enti locali 
 
2006  n.70*  Mandana Hajj and Ugo Panizza: Religion and gender gap, are Muslims 
different? 
 
2006  n.69*  Ana Maria Loboguerrero and Ugo Panizza: Inflation and labor market 
flexibility: the squeaky wheel gets the grease 
 
2006 n.68*  Alejandro  Micco,  Ugo  Panizza and Monica Yañez: Bank ownership and 
performance: does politics matter? 
 
2006  n.67*  Alejandro Micco and Ugo Panizza: Bank ownership and lending behavior 
2006 n.66*  Angela  Fraschini:  Fiscal federalism in big developing countries: China and 
India 
 
2006 n.65*  Corrado  Malandrino:  La discussione tra Einaudi e Michels sull'economia pura e 
sul metodo della storia delle dottrine economiche  
 
2006  n.64
ε  Stefania Ottone: Fairness: a survey 
2006 n.63*  Andrea  Sisto:  Propensity Score matching: un'applicazione per la creazione di un 
database integrato ISTAT-Banca d'Italia 
 
2005 n.62*  P.  Pellegrino:  La politica sanitaria in Italia: dalla riforma legislativa alla 
riforma costituzionale 
 




ε  Guido Ortona, Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano: A simulative assessment 
of the Italian electoral system 
 
2005  n.59
ε  Guido Ortona and Francesco Scacciati: Offerta di lavoro in presenza di 
tassazione: l'approccio sperimentale 
 
2005  n.58*  Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano, An extension of the model of Inequity 
Aversion by Fehr and Schmidt 
 
2005  n.57
ε  Stefania Ottone, Transfers and altruistic punishment in Solomon's Game 
experiments 
 
2005  n. 56
ε  Carla Marchese and Marcello Montefiori, Mean voting rule and strategical 
behavior: an experiment 
 
2005 n.55**  Francesco  Ingravalle,  La sussidiarietà nei trattati e nelle istituzioni politiche 
dell'UE. 
 
2005  n. 54*  Rosella Levaggi and Marcello Montefiori, It takes three to tango: soft budget 
constraint and cream skimming in the hospital care market 
 
2005 n.53*  Ferruccio  Ponzano,  Competition among different levels of government: the re-
election problem. 
 
2005  n.52*  Andrea Sisto and Roberto Zanola, Rationally addicted to cinema and TV? An 
empirical investigation of Italian consumers 
. 
2005  n.51*  Luigi Bernardi and Angela Fraschini, Tax system and tax reforms in India 
2005 n.50*  Ferruccio  Ponzano,  Optimal provision of public goods under imperfect 
intergovernmental competition. 
 
2005  n.49*  Franco Amisano e Alberto Cassone, Proprieta’ intellettuale e mercati: il ruolo 
della tecnologia e conseguenze microeconomiche 
 




ε  Guido Ortona, Voting on the Electoral System: an Experiment 
2004  n.46
ε  Stefania Ottone, Transfers and altruistic Punishments in Third Party 
Punishment Game Experiments. 
 
2004 n.45*  Daniele  Bondonio,  Do business incentives increase employment in declining 
areas? Mean impacts versus impacts by degrees of economic distress. 
 
2004 n.44**  Joerg  Luther,  La valorizzazione del Museo provinciale della battaglia di 
Marengo: un parere di diritto pubblico 
 
2004  n.43*  Ferruccio Ponzano, The allocation of the income tax among different levels of 
government: a theoretical solution 
 
2004  n.42*  Albert Breton e Angela Fraschini, Intergovernmental equalization grants: some 
fundamental principles 
 
2004  n.41*  Andrea Sisto, Roberto Zanola, Rational Addiction to Cinema? A Dynamic Panel 
Analisis of European Countries 
 




ε  Marie Edith Bissey, Claudia Canegallo, Guido Ortona and Francesco Scacciati, 
Competition vs. cooperation. An experimental inquiry 
 
2003  n.38
ε  Marie-Edith Bissey, Mauro Carini, Guido Ortona, ALEX3: a simulation program 
to compare electoral systems 
 
2003  n.37*  Cinzia Di Novi, Regolazione dei prezzi o razionamento: l’efficacia dei due 
sistemi di allocazione nella fornitura di risorse scarse a coloro che ne hanno 
maggiore necessita’ 
 
2003  n. 36*  Marilena Localtelli, Roberto Zanola, The Market for Picasso Prints: An Hybrid 
Model Approach 
 
2003  n. 35*  Marcello Montefiori, Hotelling competition on quality in the health care market. 
2003 n.  34*  Michela Gobbi, A Viable Alternative: the Scandinavian Model of  “Social 
Democracy” 
 
2002  n. 33*  Mario Ferrero, Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic  model of  
islamic extremism 
 
2002  n. 32
ε  Guido Ortona, Choosing the electoral system – why not simply the best one? 
 
2002  n. 31**  Silvano Belligni, Francesco Ingravalle, Guido Ortona, Pasquale Pasquino,  
Michel Senellart, Trasformazioni della politica. Contributi al seminario di  
Teoria politica 
 
2002 n.  30*  Franco Amisano, La corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia di tipo 
concorrenziale: modelli di analisi economica.  
 
2002  n. 29*  Marcello Montefiori, Libertà di scelta e contratti prospettici: l’asimmetria 
informativa nel mercato delle cure sanitarie ospedaliere  
 
2002  n. 28*  Daniele Bondonio, Evaluating the Employment Impact of Business Incentive  
Programs in EU Disadvantaged Areas.  A case from Northern Italy 
2002  n. 27**  Corrado Malandrino, Oltre il compromesso del Lussemburgo verso l’Europa  
federale. Walter Hallstein e la crisi della “sedia vuota”(1965-66) 
 
2002  n. 26**  Guido Franzinetti, Le Elezioni Galiziane al Reichsrat di Vienna, 1907-1911 
 
2002  n. 25
ε  Marie-Edith Bissey and Guido Ortona, A simulative frame to study the 
integration of defectors in a cooperative setting 
 
2001  n. 24*  Ferruccio Ponzano, Efficiency wages and endogenous supervision technology 
 
2001  n. 23*  Alberto Cassone and Carla Marchese,  Should the death tax die? And should it 
leave an inheritance? 
 
2001  n. 22*  Carla Marchese  and Fabio Privileggi, Who participates in tax amnesties?   
Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers 
 
2001 n.  21*  Claudia  Canegallo,  Una valutazione delle carriere dei giovani lavoratori atipici: 
la fedeltà aziendale premia? 
 
2001 n.  20*  Stefania  Ottone,  L'altruismo: atteggiamento irrazionale, strategia vincente o 
amore per il prossimo? 
 
2001 n.  19*  Stefania  Ravazzi,  La lettura contemporanea del cosiddetto dibattito fra Hobbes 
e Hume 
2001  n. 18*  Alberto Cassone e Carla Marchese, Einaudi e i servizi pubblici, ovvero come 
contrastare i monopolisti predoni e la burocrazia corrotta 
2001  n. 17*  Daniele Bondonio, Evaluating Decentralized Policies: How to Compare the 
Performance of Economic Development Programs across Different Regions or 
States. 
 
2000  n. 16*  Guido Ortona, On the Xenophobia of non-discriminated Ethnic Minorities 
 
2000  n. 15*  Marilena Locatelli-Biey and Roberto Zanola, The Market for Sculptures: An  
Adjacent Year Regression Index 
 
2000  n. 14*  Daniele Bondonio, Metodi per la valutazione degli aiuti alle imprse con 
 specifico target territoriale 
 
2000  n. 13*  Roberto Zanola, Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a 
 two-class economy 
 
2000 n.  12**  Gabriella Silvestrini, Il concetto di «governo della legge» nella tradizione  
repubblicana. 
 
2000 n.  11**  Silvano Belligni, Magistrati e politici nella crisi italiana. Democrazia dei 
guardiani e neopopulismo 
 
2000  n. 10*  Rosella Levaggi and Roberto Zanola, The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the 
Italian National Health System 
 
1999  n. 9*  Mario Ferrero, A model of the political enterprise 
 
1999 n.  8*  Claudia Canegallo, Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di 
informazione asimmetrica 
 
1999 n.  7**  Silvano  Belligni,  Corruzione, malcostume amministrativo e strategie etiche. Il 
ruolo dei codici. 
  
 
1999 n.  6*  Carla Marchese and Fabio Privileggi, Taxpayers Attitudes Towaer Risk and 
Amnesty Partecipation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case. 
 
1999  n. 5*  Luigi Montrucchio and Fabio Privileggi, On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium 
Asset Pricing Models of Lucas-Type 
 
1999  n. 4**  Guido Ortona, A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well. 
 
1999  n. 3*  Mario Poma, Benefici economici e ambientali dei diritti di inquinamento: il caso 
della riduzione dell’acido cromico dai reflui industriali. 
 
1999  n. 2*  Guido Ortona, Una politica di emergenza contro la  disoccupazione semplice, 
efficace equasi efficiente. 
 
1998  n. 1*  Fabio Privileggi, Carla Marchese and Alberto Cassone, Risk Attitudes and the 
Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent 
 
  
Department of Public Policy and Public Choice “Polis” 
 
The Department develops and encourages  research  in fields such as: 
•  theory of individual and collective choice; 
•  economic approaches to political systems; 
•  theory of public policy; 
•  public policy analysis (with reference to environment, health care, work, family, culture, 
etc.); 
•  experiments in economics and the social sciences; 
•  quantitative methods applied to economics and the social sciences; 
•  game theory; 
•  studies on social attitudes and preferences; 
•  political philosophy and political theory; 
•  history of political thought. 
 
The Department has regular members and off-site collaborators from other private or public 
organizations.  
Instructions to Authors 
 
Please ensure that the final version of your manuscript conforms to the requirements listed below: 
 
 
The manuscript should  be typewritten single-faced and double-spaced with wide margins. 
 
 
Include an abstract of no more than 100 words. 
 
 
Classify your article according to the Journal of Economic Literature classification system. 
 
 
Keep footnotes to a minimum and number them consecutively throughout the manuscript with 
superscript Arabic numerals. Acknowledgements and information on grants received can be given 
in a first footnote (indicated by an asterisk, not included in the consecutive numbering). 
 
 
Ensure that references  to publications appearing in the text are given as follows: 
COASE (1992a; 1992b, ch. 4) has also criticized this bias.... 
and 
“...the market has  an even more shadowy role than the firm” (COASE 1988, 7). 
 
 
List the complete references alphabetically as follows: 
 
Periodicals: 
KLEIN, B. (1980), “Transaction Cost Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements,” 
American Economic Review, 70(2), 356-362. 
KLEIN, B., R. G. CRAWFORD and A. A. ALCHIAN (1978), “Vertical Integration, Appropriable 




NELSON, R. R. and S. G. WINTER (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 2nd ed., 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
 
Contributions to collective works: 
STIGLITZ, J. E. (1989), “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” pp. 769-847, in  R. 
SCHMALENSEE and R. D. WILLIG (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, North 




WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1993), “Redistribution and Efficiency: The Remediableness Standard,” 
Working paper, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley. 